We deal with the fragment of modal logic consisting of implications of formulas built up from the variables and the constant 'true' by conjunction and diamonds only. The weaker language allows one to interpret the diamonds as the uniform reflection schemata in arithmetic, possibly of unrestricted logical complexity. We formulate an arithmetically complete calculus with modalities labeled by natural numbers and ω, where ω corresponds to the full uniform reflection schema, whereas n < ω corresponds to its restriction to arithmetical Π n+1 -formulas. This calculus is shown to be complete w.r.t. a suitable class of finite Kripke models and to be decidable in polynomial time.
Introduction
Several applications of provability logic in proof theory made use of a polymodal logic GLP due to Giorgi Japaridze [17, 9] . This system, although decidable, is not very easy to handle. In particular, it is not Kripke complete [9] . It is complete w.r.t. the more general topological semantics, however this could only be established recently by rather complicated techniques [2] .
A weaker system, called Reflection Calculus and denoted RC, was introduced in [8] . It is much simpler than GLP yet expressive enough to regain its main proof-theoretic applications. It has been outlined in [8] that RC allows to define a natural system of ordinal notations up to ε 0 and serves as a convenient basis for a proof-theoretic analysis of Peano Arithmetic in the style of [4, 5] . This includes a consistency proof for PA based on transfinite induction up to ε 0 , a characterization of its Π 0 n -consequences in terms of iterated reflection principles, and a combinatorial independence result.
From the point of view of modal logic, RC can be seen as a fragment of polymodal logic consisting of implications of the form A → B, where A and B are formulas built-up from ⊤ and propositional variables using just ∧ and the diamond modalities. We call such formulas A and B strictly positive and will often omit the word 'strictly.' 2 A somewhat different but equivalent axiomatization of RC (as an equational calculus) has been earlier found by Evgeny Dashkov in his paper [11] which initiated the study of strictly positive fragments of provability logics. Dashkov proved two important further facts about RC which sharply contrast with the corresponding properties of GLP. Firstly, RC is complete with respect to a natural class of finite Kripke frames. Secondly, RC is decidable in polynomial time, whereas most of the standard modal logics (including GL and GLP) are PSpace-complete.
Another advantage of going to a strictly positive language is explored in the present paper. Strictly positive modal formulas allow for more general arithmetical interpretations than those of the standard modal logic language. In particular, propositional formulas can now be interpreted as arithmetical theories rather than individual sentences. (Notice that the 'negation' of a theory would not be well-defined.)
Similarly, the diamonds need no longer be interpreted as individual consistency assertions but as the more general reflection schemata not necessarily having finite axiomatizations. Thus, for example, the full uniform reflection schema can be considered as a modality in the context of positive provability logic (see [18, 5] for general information on reflection principles). Such interpretations are not only natural but can be useful for further development of the approach to proof-theoretic analysis via provability algebras. Thus, positive provability logic allows to speak about certain notions not nicely representable in the context of the standard modal logic.
The main contribution of this paper is a Solovay-style arithmetical completeness result for an extension of RC by a new modality corresponding to the unrestricted uniform reflection principle. This is the primary example of a modality not representable in the full modal logic language. The system obtained is shown to be decidable and to enjoy a suitable complete Kripke semantics along with the finite model property.
Whereas the modal logic part of our theorem is a simple extension of Dashkov's results, the arithmetical part is more substantial. We introduce a new modification of the Solovay construction using some previous ideas from [17, 16, 7] . Since the arithmetical complexity of the unform reflection schema is unbounded, a single Solovay-style function is not enough for our purpose. Instead, we deal with infinitely many Solovay functions, of increasing arithmetical complexity, uniformly and simultaneously. 3 The paper is organized as follows. Firstly, we introduce positive modal language and the systems leading to the arithmetically complete reflection calculus RCω. Secondly, we present the details of its arithmetical interpretation and somewhat tediously prove the corresponding soundness theorem. Thirdly, we study the Kripke semantics of positive provability logics and obtain completeness results, along with a suitable version of the finite model property. Fourthly, we obtain polynomial complexity bounds for the derivability problem in RCω by adapting the techniques of Dashkov. Finally, we prove the main result of this paper, the arithmetical completeness theorem for RCω.
Reflection calculus and its basic properties
Consider a modal language L with propositional variables p, q,. . . , a constant ⊤ and connectives ∧ and α, for each ordinal α ω (understood as diamond modalities). Strictly positive formulas (or simply formulas) are built up by the grammar:
Sequents are expressions of the form A ⊢ B where A, B are strictly positive formulas. The system RJ is given by the following axioms and rules:
The systems RC and RCω are obtained from RJ by adding respectively one or two of the following principles:
Dashkov [11] showed that RJ, restricted to the language without ω modality, axiomatizes the strictly positive fragment of the polymodal logic J [6] , whereas RC axiomatizes the strictly positive fragment of GLP.
Notice that Axioms 4 are redundant in the presence of Axiom 6: if α β then αβA ⊢ ββA ⊢ βA and βαA ⊢ ββA ⊢ βA.
If L is a logic, we write A ⊢ L B for the statement that the sequent A ⊢ B is provable in L. As a simple example, consider the sequent
It is provable in RJ as follows:
, by the conjunction rules. In contrast, (ωp ∧ ωq) RCω ω(p ∧ q), as we shall see below by a simple Kripke model argument.
Formulas
We also consider the fragments of various logics obtained by restricting the language to a subset of modalities. Such a subset S ⊆ ω + 1 = {0, 1, . . . , ω} is called a signature. We denote by L S the set of all strictly positive formulas in S. Similarly, for a logic L in L we denote by L S the restriction of the axioms and rules of L to the language L S .
For a positive formula A, let ℓ(A) denote {α ω : α occurs in A}.
Proof. In each case, this is proved by an easy induction on the length of the derivation of A ⊢ B. ✷ Let C[A/p] denote the result of replacing in C all occurrences of a variable p by A. If a logic L contains Axioms 1, 2 and the first part of 3, then ⊢ L satisfies the following positive replacement lemma.
Proof. Induction on the build-up of C. ✷ A positive logic L is called normal if it contains the rules 1, 2, and the first part of 3, and is closed under the following substitution rule:
It is clear that RJ, RC and RCω, as well as their restricted versions, are normal.
Arithmetical interpretation
We define the intended arithmetical interpretation of the positive modal language. The idea is that propositional variables (and positive formulas) now denote possibly infinite theories rather than individual sentences. To avoid possible problems with the representation of theories in the language of PA, we deal with primitive recursive numerations of theories rather than with the theories as sets of sentences.
All theories in this paper will be formulated in the language of Peano Arithmetic PA and contain the axioms of PA. It is convenient to assume that the language of PA contains the symbols for all primitive recursive programs. A primitive recursive numeration of a theory S is a bounded arithmetical formula σ(x) defining the set of Gödel numbers of the axioms of S in the standard model of arithmetic. Given such a σ, we have a standard arithmetical Σ 1 -formula ✷ σ (x) expressing the provability of x in S (see [12] ). We often write ✷ σ ϕ for ✷ σ ( ϕ ). The expressionn denotes the numeral 0 ′ · · · ′ (n times). If ϕ(v) contains a parameter v, then ✷ σ ϕ(x) denotes a formula (with a parameter x) expressing the provability of the sentence ϕ(x/v) in S.
Given two numerations σ and τ , we write σ ⊢ PA τ if
, that is, if the theory numerated by σ contains the one numerated by τ . We will only consider the numerations σ such that σ ⊢ PA σ PA , where σ PA is some standard numeration of PA.
With any finite extension of PA of the form PA + ϕ we will associate its standard numeration σ PA ∨ (x = ϕ ) that will be denoted ϕ. For obvious reasons we have: ϕ ⊢ PA ψ iff ϕ ⊢ ψ iff PA + ϕ ⊢ ψ. (The statement ϕ ⊢ PA ψ implies PA + ϕ ⊢ ψ by the soundness of PA, the converse is formalizable in PA.)
Given a numeration σ of S, the consistency of S is expressed by Con(σ) := ¬✷ σ ⊥. A theory S is called n-consistent if S together with the set of all true Σ n+1 -sentences is consistent. The n-consistency of S is expressed by the formula
where T n is the standard Π n+1 -truthdefinition for Π n+1 -formulas (see [14] ) and x ∈ Π n+1 denotes the primitive recursive formula expressing that x is a Gödel number of a Π n+1 -sentence.
Concerning the truthdefinitions we assume that PA ⊢ ϕ ↔ T n ( ϕ ), for each Π n+1 -sentence ϕ. Moreover, this very fact can be formalized in PA uniformly in n:
as the sequence of formulas T n is primitive recursive in n and the corresponding proofs are constructed inductively. The formula Con n (σ) is often called the global Π n+1 -reflection principle for S and is denoted RFN Π n+1 (S) (see [19, 3] ). We note that the formula Con 0 (σ) is PA-provably equivalent to Con(σ).
The uniform reflection principle for S is the schema
It is well-known that Con ω (σ) is PA-provably equivalent to the schema
for each arithmetical formula ϕ(x), which is usually denoted RFN(S). The uniform reflection principle is elementarily axiomatized, and we fix a standard function mapping any numeration σ to the numeration of PA + Con ω (σ) (denoted Con ω (σ)). Similarly, the formula
numerating the theory PA + Con n (σ) will be denoted Con n (σ).
The intended arithmetical interpretation maps positive modal formulas to primitive recursive numerations in such a way that ⊤ corresponds to the standard numeration of PA, ∧ corresponds to the union of theories, n corresponds to the standard numeration of Con n , for each n < ω, and ω to the standard numeration of Con ω . Definition 3.1. An arithmetical interpretation is a map * from positive modal formulas to numerations satisfying the following conditions:
• (nA) * = Con n (A * ); (ωA) * = Con ω (A * ).
It is clear that the value A * is completely determined by the interpretations p * 1 , . . . , p * n of all the variables occurring in A. Proof. Induction on the length of proof of A ⊢ B in RCω. The validity of the first two groups of rules of RCω is obvious. We treat the modal axioms and rules. If σ ⊢ PA τ then clearly Con n (σ) ⊢ PA Con n (τ ), for each n < ω. Since this fact is formalizable in PA, we also obtain Con ω (σ) ⊢ PA Con ω (τ ). Also, the validity of the monotonicity axioms 6 is clear. Next we need the following lemma. 
Proof. We only prove Statement (ii). We reason in PA as follows.
Assume x ∈ Π n+1 and ✷ σ (x). Then ✷ PA (x ∈ Π n+1 ∧ ✷ σ (x)). On the other hand, by the definition of Con n (σ)
This yields
so we obtain ✷ Con n (σ) T n (x), and hence
Proof. Since the theories numerated by Con n (σ) and Con n (Con n (σ)) are finite extensions of PA, for a proof of Statement (i) it is sufficient to show
Since Con n (σ) is a Π n+1 -sentence, we can take in Lemma 3.3 ϕ = Con n (σ) and S = PA + ϕ. This yields statement (2) . For a proof of (ii), we show an informal version of this statement by an argument formalizable in PA. We must prove that, for each n < ω,
Using the monotonicity and Statement (i) we reason as follows:
This shows the claim. ✷ Corollary 3.4 shows the soundness of the third group of rules of RCω. As we mentioned above, the fourth group is actually derivable from the first three and the monotonicity, so we can skip it. We show the soundness of Axiom 5.
Proof. We reason in PA as follows: If ϕ ∈ Π n+1 and ✷ σ∨Con m (τ ) (ϕ), then by the formalized deduction theorem ✷ σ (Con m (τ ) → ϕ). Since m < n, the formula Con m (τ ) → ϕ belongs to Π n+1 . By Con n (σ) we obtain
Proof. Informally, we must prove, for each n, that
We can assume n > m and then use the previous lemma. This argument is formalizable in PA. ✷ Corollary 3.7. Con ω (σ) ⊢ PA σ.
Proof. We reason as follows:
This shows the soundness of the remaining Axiom 7 of RC and completes the proof of Proposition 3.2. ✷
Kripke models for RCω
Kripke frames and models are understood in this paper in the usual sense. A Kripke frame W for the language L S consists of a non-empty set W equipped with a family of binary relations (R α ) α∈S . A Kripke frame W is called finite if so is W and all but finitely many relations R α are empty.
A Kripke model W is a Kripke frame together with a valuation v : W × Var → {0, 1} assigning a truth value to each propositional variable at every node of W. As usual, we write W, x A to denote that a formula A is true at a node x of a model W. This relation is inductively defined as follows:
• W, x ⊤; W, x A ∧ B ⇐⇒ (W, x A and W, x B);
• W, x αA ⇐⇒ ∃y (xR α y and W, y A).
We call a RJ S -frame a Kripke frame satisfying the following conditions, for all α, β ∈ S and all x, y, z ∈ W :
(polytransitivity)
• xR α y and xR β z implies yR β z, if α > β.
These conditions can be more succinctly written as R α R β ⊆ R min(α,β) and
, respectively, is a Kripke model based on an RJ S -frame (RC S -frame). We speak about RJand RC-frames and models whenever S = ω + 1.
The persistence axiom ωA ⊢ A does not correspond to a frame condition. 4 We call a Kripke model (downwards) persistent if, for each variable p, W, x p and yR ω x ⇒ W, y p.
By a straightforward induction we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Let W be a persistent Kripke model based on a polytransitive frame. Then, for each positive formula A, W, x A and yR ω x ⇒ W, y A.
We say that a sequent A ⊢ B is true in a Kripke model W, if
A logic L is sound for a class C of Kripke models (of the same signature), if every sequent A ⊢ B provable in L is true in any model from C. It is easy to see that our logics are sound for their respective classes of models.
Lemma 4.2. (i) RJ S is sound for the class of all RJ S -models;
(ii) RC S is sound for the class of all RC S -models; (iii) RCω S is sound for the class of all persistent RC S -models.
A proof of this lemma is routine. Notice that the frame conditions for the logics RJ S and RC S (that is, polytransitivity, condition J, and monotonicity) are closure conditions. Therefore, for any Kripke frame
The frame W is unique up to isomorphism. We call it the RJ S -closure (RC S -closure) of W.
Example 4.3. Consider a Kripke frame W = (W, (R α ) α ω ) with W = {0, 1, 2}. Relation R ω consists of two pairs 0R ω 1 and 0R ω 2, and the other relations are empty. Let W be the RC-closure of W. It is easy to see that R ω = R ω , whereas, for each n < ω, R n ↾ {1, 2} is a total relation, 0R n 1 and 0R n 2. Further, we define v(x, p) = 0 iff x = 2, and v(x, q) = 0 iff x = 1. This
The completeness proofs in all these cases are also easy. As in Dashkov [11] , we present an argument based on a (simplified) version of filtrated canonical model.
Let Φ be a set of L-formulas. Denote ℓ(Φ) := {α ω : α occurs in some A ∈ Φ}. A set Φ is called adequate if Φ is closed under subformulas, ⊤ ∈ Φ and
• If βA ∈ Φ and β < α ∈ ℓ(Φ), then αA ∈ Φ;
It is easy to see that any finite set of formulas can be extended to a finite adequate set.
Let Γ be a set of L-formulas and L a logic. We shall take for L one of RJ, RC or RCω, or their restricted versions in the language L S where S ⊆ ω + 1. We write Γ ⊢ L B if there are formulas A 1 , . . . , A n ∈ Γ such that the sequent
Fix an adequate set of formulas Φ. An L-theory in Φ is a set x ⊆ Φ such that x ⊢ L A and A ∈ Φ implies A ∈ x. Define a model W L /Φ as follows. The set of nodes W L /Φ is the set of all L-theories in Φ. 5 We stipulate that xR α y iff α ∈ ℓ(Φ) and the following conditions hold for each formula A: R1. A ∈ y and αA ∈ Φ implies αA ∈ x; R2. βA ∈ y and αA ∈ Φ implies min(α, β)A ∈ x; R3. β < α and βA ∈ x implies βA ∈ y.
We also let W L /Φ, x p iff p ∈ x, for any L-theory x.
Proof. To check the polytransitivity assume xR α yR β z and α, β ∈ ℓ(Φ). We show xR min(α,β) z by checking R1-R3. If A ∈ z and min(α, β)A ∈ Φ, then by the adequacy βA ∈ Φ and hence βA ∈ y. It follows that min(α, β)A ∈ x.
For R2 notice that min(γ, α, β) = min(γ, min(α, β)). If γA ∈ z and min(γ, α, β)A ∈ Φ then by the adequacy min(γ, β)A ∈ Φ and hence min(γ, β)A ∈ y. This in turn implies min(γ, β, α)A ∈ x. Condition R3 is obviously satisfied, as all three theories have the same formulas of the form βA for β < α.
Second, we check condition (J). Assume xR α y and xR β z with α < β. We show zR α y. R1: If A ∈ y and αA ∈ Φ then αA ∈ x. Since α < β this implies αA ∈ z. R2: If γA ∈ y and αA ∈ Φ then min(γ, α)A ∈ x whence min(γ, α)A ∈ z for the same reason. R3 is, again, obvious. ✷
Proof. Induction on the build-up of A. If A is a variable, ⊤ or has the form B ∧ C, the argument is obvious. Assume A = αB.
If x αB then, for some y such that xR α y, we have y B. By IH it follows that B ∈ y and hence αB ∈ x. Now assume αB ∈ x. Let ∆ := {βC : βC ∈ x, β < α} and let y be the deductive closure of ∆ ∪ {B} in Φ. By the IH we have y B. We claim that xR α y which completes the argument.
Proof. (i) Assume xR α y and β < α ∈ ℓ(Φ). We show xR β y by checking the three conditions. If A ∈ y and βA ∈ Φ then αA ∈ Φ by the adequacy of Φ. Hence, αA ∈ x and therefore by the monotonicity axioms x ⊢ βA. Since βA ∈ Φ we obtain βA ∈ x. Similarly, if γA ∈ y and βA ∈ Φ then αA ∈ Φ by the adequacy. Therefore, min(α, γ)A ∈ x, whence by the monotonicity axioms x ⊢ min(β, γ)A. Since both γA and βA are in Φ, it follows that min(β, γ)A ∈ x which proves the second condition. The third condition is obviously satisfied.
(ii) Assume xR ω y. If y p then p ∈ y; by the adequacy ωp ∈ Φ and hence ωp ∈ x. It follows that x ⊢ L ωp ⊢ L p and x p. ✷ Taking Φ = L and W L := W L /Φ we obtain the completeness of RJ, RC and RCω w.r.t. their respective classes of models.
Proof. The three systems are sound by Lemma 4.2. The completeness is proved by observing that W L , for each of the three logics L, is a model of the corresponding type. Assume A L B. Then letting x denote the L-theory generated by A we have B / ∈ x, hence by Lemma 4.5 W L , x B. ✷ Next we discuss the finite model property of the three logics. For RJ the answer is obvious, but for RC and RCω we have a small complication due to the fact that modality ω is present in the language. Proof. Assume A RJ B, let Φ be a finite adequate set of formulas containing both A and B. We have W RJ /Φ, x A and W RJ /Φ, x B. Moreover, W RJ /Φ is a finite RJ S -model, where S = ℓ(Φ). By putting R α := ∅, for any α / ∈ ℓ(Φ), we expand W RJ /Φ to an RJ-model in L falsifying A ⊢ B. ✷ A similar argument does not quite work for RC, as the expansion by empty relations leads, in general, outside the class of RC-models. However, for a finite signature S we do have an analog of Theorem 1.
Lemma 4.9. Let S ⊆ ω + 1 and α / ∈ S. Any RC S -model can be expanded to an RC S∪{α} -model.
Proof. Let W = (W, (R β ) β∈S ) be a given RC S -model. Denote: S + := {β ∈ S : α < β} and S − := {β ∈ S : β < α}. If S + = ∅ we can put R α := ∅. Otherwise, for any relation R on W , denote
Further, define R α := n∈ω R n α , where R 0
Notice that R ⊆ R ′ , for any R. It follows that R β ⊆ R 0 α ⊆ R α , for each β ∈ S + . By the construction, R α is transitive and R −1 β R α ⊆ R α , hence condition (J) is satisfied for all α < β ∈ S + . Moreover, the polytransitivity follows from the transitivity and the monotonicity properties. Therefore, (W, (R β ) β∈S + ∪{α} ) is an RC S + ∪{α} -model.
To complete the argument we have to show that (W, (R γ ) γ∈S − ∪{α} ) is an RC S − ∪{α} -model. To this end we prove that, for each n and γ ∈ S − ,
Both statements are verified by induction on n. The basis of induction holds, since the original model was an RC S -model. Assume the statements hold for R = R n α and consider
Remark 4.10. The given proof also works for the more general analogs of RC, e.g., for logics with linearly ordered sets of modalities (see [1] ).
Taking into account that expansions of persistent models are persistent, we obtain the following theorem for both RC and RCω. Theorem 2. Let L be either RC or RCω. The following statements are equivalent:
Proof. Clearly, (iii) implies (i), and (i) implies (ii) since a finite derivation may only contain finitely many different modalities. We prove that (ii) implies (iii). Assume A L S B. By Corollary 4.8 there is a finite RC Smodel W falsifying A ⊢ B (which is persistent if L = RCω). Assume any finite U be given. We may assume S ⊆ U (otherwise clearly A L U B). By Lemma 4.9, W can be expanded to an RC U -model falsifying the same sequent. Hence, A L U B. ✷
For the logics RJ and RC a sharper result can be stated. As we have seen, the question whether a sequent A ⊢ B is provable in such a logic L is equivalent to the same question for the logic L S with S = ℓ({A, B}). However, for any finite S, the logic L S is modulo renaming of modalities the same logic as L n for n = |S| (we identify n with the set {0, . . . , n − 1}). The systems L n are shown to be polytime decidable [11] . Therefore, we obtain Corollary 4.12. The systems RJ and RC are polytime decidable.
The same result holds for RCω, however we cannot directly refer to Dashkov's theorem. This question is considered in the next section, where we also obtain somewhat sharper complexity estimates for the cases RJ and RC. The material of that section, up to Theorem 3, is due to Dashkov [11] .
Polytime decidability of RCω
We have to develop some combinatorial techniques to deal with positive logics. It allows one to state the Kripke completeness results in a sharper form, from which the complexity bounds are easily read off.
Let W be a Kripke model and a ∈ W . The submodel W a of W generated by a is obtained by restricting all the relations and the valuation of W to the set of all nodes x ∈ W such that there is a path a = x 0 Rx 1 R . . . Rx n = x where R = α∈S R α . A model W is called rooted if it has a distinguished element a (called the root) such that W a = W. We notice that in polytransitive rooted frames every node is reachable from the root in one step. • Each R α on T [A] is an irreflexive forest-like binary relation; Proof. We prove Statement (ii). Theorem 3 yields an efficient decision procedure for the logics RC and RJ. Firstly, given a positive formula A we let S = ℓ({A, B}) and build the model RC S [A]. Secondly, we check if B is satisfied at the root of this model. To estimate the complexity of this procedure we need to be more specific about the chosen computation model.
We consider random access machines (see [10] ) and assume that any register can hold (the code of) any symbol including the variables and the modalities. To simplify the estimates we count the size of any symbol as one, and we assume that the elementary operations such as reading and writing a symbol, as well as the comparison of symbols, cost a constant amount of time. We are going to estimate the number of elementary steps needed to decide whether A ⊢ RC B. (Representing the variables and the modalities more faithfully would introduce a logarithmic factor into our estimates.) First, we estimate the time needed to build the model RC S [A] given A.
We support a data structure for a positive formula A (and for the corresponding Kripke model T [A]) with the arrows represented by pointers. The arrows are labeled by the elements of S, the nodes are labeled by the variables of A. We can also realize these labels as pointers to some extra nodes representing the variables and the modalities, respectively. We assume that there is a fixed ordering of arrows outgoing from any given node of the tree T [A] (which respects the left-to-right ordering of the corresponding subformulas of A). It is well-known that we can very efficiently (in a linear number of steps) parse the formula A to build such a tree.
Next we bring T [A] to a special ordered form. Let L m denote the language L U with U = [m, ω]. A formula will be called a fact if it is either ⊤ or a conjunction of variables. Ordered formulas are defined inductively. The algorithm of ordering a formula is similar to that of sorting a string, and it is easy to obtain a rough quadratic upper bound, a detailed proof of which we omit.
Lemma 5.8. Any formula A can be ordered in O(|A| 2 ) steps.
An ordered formula A can be written in the following form: 1. aR n x, for each i < k, n m i , j < n i and x ∈ RC S i [A ij ]; 2. xR n y, for each i < k, m i+1 n < m i , and x, y ∈ p i j<np RC Sp [A pj ] (where we formally let m k = 0); 3. xR m i y, for each i < k, y
Proof. It is easy to see that all the relations mentioned in items 1-3 must hold in RC S [A].
1. By the polytransitivity we have aR m i x, for each x ∈ RC S i [A ij ]. Then, by the monotonicity, aR n x, for all n m i .
2. If x, y ∈ p i j<np RC Sp [A pj ] then aR m i x, y by Item 1, since m p m i , for each p i. In particular, for each n < m i , there holds aR n y. Then by property (J) we obtain xR n y.
3. For any x, y as specified we have aR m i y and aR m i−1 x by Item 1. Since m i−1 > m i , by (J) we obtain xR m i y.
It is also a routine but somewhat lengthy check that the model described in Lemma 5.9 is, indeed, an RC S -model. Hence, it must coincide with RC S [A]. ✷ A similar but much simpler characterization holds for RJ S [A] . In this case, we do not need to assume that A is ordered. If x, y ∈ T [A] let x ⊓ y denote the greatest lower bound of x, y, that is, the unique node z such that there are oriented paths from z to x and to y without any shared edges. Given a nonempty path P let m(P ) denote the minimal modality label occurring on P . Proof. It is well-known that the problem of checking whether a modal formula ϕ is true at the root of a finite Kripke model W in a finite signature S is solvable in time O( W · |ϕ|), where W denotes the sum of |W | and the number of pairs (x, y) such that xR α y, for some α ∈ S (see [15, Proposition 3 .1]). 6 Letting S = ℓ({A, B}) and n = |S| we can estimate |RC S For the logic RJ this can be slightly improved. By Lemma 5.10, we can observe that in the graph RJ S [A] (where S = ℓ(A)) there is no more than one arrow between any pair of points. This yields a bound O(|A| 2 ) on RJ S [A] and on the complexity of constructing this model. Consequently, the derivability problem can be solved in O(|A| 2 · |B|) many steps. ✷ Remark 5.12. Since the input of the problem is naturally divided into two parts A and B, measuring the complexity in terms of two parameters |A| and |B| appears to be more meaningful than expressing it in terms of the total length of the input. Thus, the more informative bounds are O(|A| 2 · n · |B|) for RC and O(|A| 2 · |B|) for RJ.
Next we turn to the logic RCω. We define RCω S [A] as the model whose frame coincides with that of RC S [A] and whose valuation function v ′ satisfies: 
Irreflexive models
The Solovay construction works with the irreflexive models. Therefore we would like to have a characterization of RC and RCω in terms of suitable irreflexive models. We modify the construction of the canonical model from the previous section. This modification is similar to the one given by Dashkov [11] which in turn derives from the work of Japaridze [17] and Ignatiev [16] .
Let L be a logic containing RC and let Φ be an adequate set of formulas. We work in the setup of the previous section. We define a Kripke model W ′ L /Φ which coincides with W L /Φ but for the definition of the relations. We stipulate that xR ′ α y in W ′ L /Φ iff xR α y and following condition holds: R4. There is a formula αA ∈ x such that αA / ∈ y.
The model W ′ L /Φ has the following properties.
In order to prove the canonical model lemma we need an additional fact.
Lemma 6.2. For any A and α, A RCω αA.
Proof. The simplest proof of this fact involves arithmetical interpretations. Assume A ⊢ RCω αA. Fix an arithmetical interpretation * mapping all variables to the standard numeration of PA. By Proposition 3.2 we obtain A * ⊢ PA Con α (A * ). Since A is a positive formula, A * is (a numeration of) a sound arithmetical theory T . However, this contradicts Gödel's second incompleteness theorem for T . ✷
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 4.5. We only treat somewhat differently the case A = αB, the 'if' part. Assume αB ∈ x. As before let ∆ := {βC : βC ∈ x, β < α} and let y be the deductive closure of ∆ ∪ {B} in Φ. By the IH we have y B. We claim that xR ′ α y which completes the argument. We already know from Lemma 4.5 that xR α y. To check R4 it is sufficient to observe that αB ∈ x but αB / ∈ y. If αB ∈ y we would obtain Σ, B ⊢ L αB, for some finite
βA, αA ∈ Φ and α < β ∈ ℓ(Φ). By the adequacy of Φ we have βA ∈ Φ. Then by Lemma 6.3 we obtain βA ∈ x. Hence, x ⊢ L αA and since αA ∈ Φ also αA ∈ x. This yields W ′ L /Φ, x αA by Lemma 6.3.
Statement (ii) is obvious by Lemma 6.3, since W L /Φ is persistent. ✷
We summarize the information obtained so far for L = RCω.
Proposition 6.5. Let Φ be a finite adequate set. Then there is a finite model W such that (i) W is an irreflexive RJ-model; (ii) R α = ∅, for all α / ∈ ℓ(Φ); (iii) W is Φ-monotone and persistent; (iv) For any RCω-theory Γ in Φ there is a node x ∈ W such that, for any formula A, A ∈ Γ iff W, x A.
Arithmetical completeness
Theorem 6. For any sequent A ⊢ B the following statements are equivalent:
(ii) A * ⊢ PA B * , for all arithmetical interpretations * ; (iii) A * ⊢ B * , for all arithmetical interpretations * .
Proof. The implication from (i) to (ii) is Proposition 3.2. Statement (ii) trivially implies (iii). To infer (i) from (iii)
we argue by contraposition and assume A RCω B. Consider a finite adequate set Φ containing A, B, and let W be a finite Kripke model satisfying the conditions of Proposition 6.5. It falsifies A ⊢ B at some node x. We can restrict W to the submodel generated by x, so that W is rooted and falsifies A ⊢ B at the root.
Now we proceed to a Solovay-type construction. As usual, we identify the nodes of W with a finite set of natural numbers {1, . . . , N } so that 1 is the root. We then attach a new root 0 to W by stipulating that 0R 0 x, for each x ∈ W . The valuation of variables at 0 will be the same as in 1, this ensures that the new model is persistent. Abusing notation we denote this model by the same letter W. We also assume that the R α relations and the forcing relation x C on W are arithmetized in a natural way by bounded (even open) arithmetical formulas.
We fix an arithmetical formula Prf n (x, y) naturally expressing that y is a proof of a formula x from the axioms of PA and true Π n -sentences. The formula Prf n (x, y) has logical complexity ∆ n+1 in PA. Without loss of generality we may also assume that Prf n is chosen in such a way that each number y is a proof of at most one formula, and that any provable formula has arbitrarily long proofs. These properties are also assumed to hold provably in PA.
The formula ✷ n (x) := ∃y Prf n (x, y) expresses that x is provable in PA from the set of all true Π n -sentences. We usually write ✷ n ϕ for ✷ n ( ϕ ). It is easy to see that Con n (σ PA ) is equivalent to ¬✷ n ⊥.
Definition 7.1. Let M denote the maximal modality m < ω occurring in Φ, if there is such an m, and 0 otherwise. We define a family of Solovay-style functions h n : ω → W, for all n < ω, as follows: h n (0) = 0 and
Here ℓ k denotes the limit of the function h k . The functions h n can be defined in such a way as to satisfy the following conditions:
• The graph of each h n is definable by a formula H n which is ∆ n+1 in PA;
• The function ϕ : n → H n is primitive recursive;
• Each h n satisfies the clauses of Definition 7.1 provably in PA.
The definition of the functions h n can be arranged as a solution of a fixed point equation in PA using the standard methods. The details are given in the Appendix.
Informally, the behavior of the functions h n can be described as follows. The functions with lower index have higher priority, therefore whenever h m makes a move to y, all functions h n with n > m do the same. Otherwise, h n moves like the usual Solovay function, but for the following peculiarities:
• h n also reacts to proofs of the limit statements for all functions of lower priority (not only to those of itself);
• h n is not only allowed to move along the R n relation but also along R ω .
Lemma 7.2. For each n, m, provably in PA,
Proof. Statement (i) is proved by (external) induction on n. First, we observe that, by the polytransitivity, the relation R n ∪ R ω is transitive and irreflexive, for each n. Now it is easy to see that the limit of h 0 exists, as h 0 only moves along R 0 ∪ R ω . Suppose ℓ n−1 exists. As soon as h n−1 reaches its limit, h n can only move along R n ∪ R ω . Hence, ℓ n exists. Statement (ii) follows from the same consideration and the fact that h n+1 has to visit ℓ n on its way to the limit. Statement (iii) is obtained from (ii) by induction on n. ✷ Lemma 7.3. For all n, N (ℓ n = 0).
Proof. By Lemma 7.2, for all n > M , either ℓ n R ω ℓ n+1 or ℓ n+1 = ℓ n , as R k = ∅ for k > M . Since R ω is transitive and irreflexive, there is a z ∈ W and an m such that ℓ n = z, for all n m. Assume z = 0 and let m be the minimal n such that ℓ n = z. Then the function h m has to come to z by the second clause of Definition 7.1. Hence, for some n max(M, m), ✷ m (ℓ n =z). Since PA is sound, ℓ n =z is true, which is not the case since n m. ✷ For any modal formula C, let ℓ n C denote {ℓ n =ā : a C}.
Lemma 7.4. For any formula C, for all n > m M ,
Proof. Each h n for n > M can only follow the R ω relation. By the persistence of W, the truth of any formula is inherited downwards along R ω . Hence, the claim follows from Lemma 7.2. ✷ Lemmas 7.2, 7.4 are obviously formalizable in PA (uniformly in m, n). Suppose {ϕ i : i ∈ I} is a primitive recursive set of formulas. With a primitive recursive program computing this set we associate a numeration for the theory PA + {ϕ i : i ∈ I} that will be denoted [ϕ i : i ∈ I]. We write Con n [ϕ i : i ∈ I] for Con n ([ϕ i : i ∈ I]). In particular, if this set is a singleton {ϕ}, the formula Con n [ϕ] means the same as Con n (ϕ) and is PA-equivalent to ¬✷ n ¬ϕ.
Using this notation, we interpret each propositional variable p as follows:
We prove the following two main lemmas.
Lemma 7.5. For any formula C ∈ Φ,
Proof. Induction on the build-up of C. The cases of propositional variables, ⊤ and ∧ are easy. Assume C = mD for m < ω. Since (mD) * = Con m (D * ) numerates a finite extension of PA, it will be sufficient in this case to infer Con m (D * ) from ℓ M mD in PA. We have, by the IH,
which is by Lemma 7.4 equivalent to
Thus, we are going to infer sentence (4) from ℓ M mD by formalizing the following argument in PA. Assume ℓ M mD, hence there is a z such that z D and ℓ M R m z. Consider the point ℓ m . By Lemma 7.2, either
. Let x 0 be such that ∀x x 0 h m (x) = ℓ m . There is a y > x such that Prf m ( ℓ n =z , y). Then, h m (y + 1) has to be different from ℓ m , a contradiction. This shows that ℓ M mD implies (4), as required.
Consider the case C = ωD. Firstly, we have
where we may restrict the left hand side to n M , since the strength of the formulas Con n increases with n. By Lemma 7.4 and the IH, as before,
We are going to show that
To this end it is sufficient to prove by an argument formalizable in PA that, for any n M ,
Consider any n M and assume ℓ n ωD. There is a z ∈ W such that z D and
. This means that h n must take on a value other than ℓ n , a contradiction. ✷ Lemma 7.6. For any formula C ∈ Φ,
Proof. Induction on the build-up of C. The cases of propositional variables, ⊤ and ∧ are trivial. Assume C = mD for m < ω. Since ℓ 0 = 0 is equivalent to a Σ 1 -formula, we obtain
Thus, it is sufficient to prove, for each n M , that
We reason as follows. Assume ℓ n mD. By Lemma 7.2 we have ℓ m R k ℓ n , for some k > m, or ℓ m R ω ℓ n or ℓ m = ℓ n . Since W is a RJ-frame, in each case
Let a := ℓ m , we have Therefore, we conclude:
On the other hand, we claim that ∀z ∈ R * m (a) z D. Indeed, if aR α z, α m and z D, then a αD whence a mD, by the Φ-monotonicity of W. This contradicts (5) . Since the formula ∀z ∈ R * m (a) z D is bounded, it follows that
Next we consider the minimal i m such that ℓ i = ℓ m = a. Since we assume ℓ 0 = 0, we also have ℓ m = a = 0. The function h i could only have come to a by the second clause of the definition of h i , therefore we obtain
Since i m, obviously we can weaken this to
Together with (6) this yields ∃k M ✷ m (ℓ k ∈ R * m (ā)), whence by (7) we obtain ∃k M ✷ m (ℓ k D), as required.
Finally, consider the case C = ωD. We have
For each of the axioms Con n (D * ) such that n M , by the IH and persistence we obtain, as before,
This fact is formalizable in PA uniformly in n, therefore
which completes the proof, because by Lemma 7.4
Thus, we prove by an argument formalizable in PA uniformly in n that, for any n > M ,
Assume n > M , ℓ n ωD and let a := ℓ n . Since ℓ 0 = 0 we have a = 0. Consider the minimal m n such that ℓ m = ℓ n = a. As before, we first show that
We consider two cases. If m > M then we have both L m (a) and
we can infer ℓ k ∈ R ω (ā) ∪ {ā}, since h k can only make moves along the R ω relation from a onwards. (Here, R ω (a) := {x ∈ W : aR ω x}.) Hence, ∀k m ✷ m (ℓ k ∈ R ω (ā) ∪ {ā}) and the claim holds.
If m M < n we first notice that ℓ M = a. Then, ✷ n (ℓ M =ā), since the formula ℓ M =ā is Σ M +2 ⊆ Σ n+1 . Moreover, ℓ M = a implies ℓ k ∈ R ω (a) ∪ {a}, for any k > M , since h k will only be able to move along R ω from a onwards. Thus, we obtain ∀k M ✷ n (ℓ k ∈ R ω (ā) ∪ {ā}), and the claim also holds.
Secondly, we note that ℓ k ∈ R ω (a) implies ℓ k D, as ∀z ∈ R ω (a) z D. Hence, by (9) , Hence, A * ⊢ B * yields S ⊢ ℓ M = 1. It follows that S is inconsistent. Since PA ⊢ ℓ n = 1 → ℓ m = 1, for all m n, the inconsistency of S yields a PA-proof of ℓ n = 1, for some n M . This means that h 0 must eventually take on a value other than 0, hence ℓ 0 = 0. But this is impossible, since ℓ 0 = 0 is true in the standard model. ✷ Primitive recursive numerations of these theories can be obtained from the proof of Theorem 6 applied to (an irreflexive version of) the three-element Kripke model described in Example 4.3.
We remark that none of these two theories can have bounded arithmetical complexity over PA. Suppose S is axiomatized by a set of Π n+1 -sentences over PA. Then, by Lemma 3.3, Con n (σ) ⊢ PA σ. By Corollary 3.6, it follows that PA + Con ω (σ) + Con ω (τ ) ⊢ Con ω (τ ∨ Con n (σ)) ⊢ Con ω (τ ∨ σ).
This shows that the use of infinitely axiomatized theories to interpret propositional variables is necessary for the validity of Theorem 6.
Conclusions
We believe that positive provability logic, despite the absence of Löb's axiom, strikes a good balance between expressivity and efficiency (the latter can be understood formally, as the computational efficiency, as well as informally, in the sense of convenience). Together with [11] this paper shows that positive logic can be nicely treated both syntactically and semantically. More importantly, it has very natural proof-theoretic interpretations not extendable to the full modal logic language.
There are many questions related to this logic that can be further investigated. One direction is to study normal positive logics along the lines of the usual normal modal logics. In particular, we are interested in their efficient proof systems, general results on axiomatization and completeness, interpolation properties, and so on.
Another direction is the study of different arithmetical interpretations of positive provability logic. For example, one can consider from this point of view transfinite iterations of consistency assertions (or of higher reflection principles). That is, one can introduce modalities ✸ α , for each ordinal α of some canonical ordinal notation system, and interpret them as the schemata Con α related to the so-called Turing progressions: Con 0 (σ) = Con(σ); Con α (σ) = {Con[Con β (σ)] : β < α}. It would be interesting to find a complete axiomatization of the corresponding positive logic.
Another generalization is to consider stronger reflection schemata definable in the extensions of arithmetical language, e.g., in the second order arithmetic or in the arithmetic enriched by truthpredicates. This generalization is particularly interesting from the point of view of applications in the ordinal analysis of predicative theories.
Here, the formulas A n directly mimic Definition 7.1. It is easy to convince oneself that the arithmetical complexity of the formulas A n (and hence, of the formulas H ′ n ) is ∆ n+1 in PA. The most complex part of the definition is the formula ∃k max(M, n) Prf n ( ℓ k =z , x) occurring in the second clause. In the formula A n this part takes the form ∃k max(M, n) Prf n (g(e, k, z), x).
Observe that the predicate Prf n is ∆ n+1 (even ∆ 0 (Σ n )), and the existential quantifier ∃k can, in fact, be bounded by x. This yields a ∆ n+1 -formula.
It is also clear that each formula H ′ n is obtained from the previous ones in a primitive recursive way. Therefore, there is a primitive recursive function F satisfying F (e, n) = H ′ n (ē, x, y) . Finally, we obtain the required number e by applying (a formalized version of) recursion theorem for primitive recursive functions: ϕ e (n) := F (e, n). Then we can define H n (x, y) := H ′ n (ē, x, y).
